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Abstract—We study a wiretap channel model where
the sender has M transmit antennas and there are two
groups consisting of J1 and J2 receivers respectively.
Each receiver has a single antenna. We consider two
scenarios. First we consider the compound wiretap model
— group 1 constitutes the set of legitimate receivers, all
interested in a common message, whereas group 2 is the
set of eavesdroppers. We establish new lower and upper
bounds on the secure degrees of freedom. Our lower
bound is based on the recently proposed real interference
alignment scheme. The upper bound provides the first
known example which illustrates that the pairwise upper
bound used in earlier works is not tight.
The second scenario we study is the compound private
broadcast channel. Each group is interested in a message
that must be protected from the other group. Upper and
lower bounds on the degrees of freedom are developed by
extending the results on the compound wiretap channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wyner’s wiretap channel [2] is an information theo-
retic model for secure communications at the physical
layer. In this model, there are three terminals — a
sender, a receiver and an eavesdropper. A wiretap
code simultaneously meets a reliability constraint with
respect to the legitimate receiver and a secrecy con-
straint with respect to the eavesdropper. In recent times,
there has been a significant interest in applying this
model to wireless communication systems. Some re-
cent works include secure communications over fading
channels [3]–[5], multi-antenna wiretap channels [6]–
[14] and several multiuser extensions of the wiretap
channel.
The wiretap channel requires that channel statistics
of all the terminals be globally known. This model
is justified in applications where the receiver channels
are degraded. The wiretap code can be designed for
the strongest (worst-case) eavesdropper in the class
of all eavesdropper channels. However in many cases
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of practical interest, such as in the case of multi-
antenna channels, the receivers cannot be ordered in
this fashion. There is no natural choice for the “worst-
case” eavesdropper and the ordering of the eavesdrop-
pers depends on the transmit directions. Hence it is
natural to study an extension of the wiretap channel
that explicitly incorporates the lack of knowledge
of the receiver channels i.e., the compound wiretap
channel. This model was recently studied in [3], [15],
[16]. The channels of the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropper take one of finitely many values.
Note that this problem is equivalent to broadcasting a
common message to multiple intended receivers, one
corresponding to each channel state, while keeping the
message secure against a collection of non-colluding
eavesdroppers. A lower bound on the secrecy capacity
is established in [15]. One special case where the
optimality of this scheme holds is the deterministic
wiretap channel with a single realization of the legiti-
mate receiver. In this case the lower bound coincides
with a natural pairwise upper bound on the secrecy
capacity. The pairwise bound is obtained as follows.
We consider the secrecy capacity associated with one
particular pair of legitimate receiver and eavesdropper
by ignoring the presence of all other terminals. Clearly
this constitutes an upper bound on the capacity. The
pairwise upper bound is obtained by selecting the pair
with the smallest capacity. The pairwise upper bound
was also used in establishing the secrecy capacity
in [3], [4], [16] for a class of parallel reversely de-
graded compound wiretap channels. In [3] the authors
consider the case of multiple legitimate receivers and
one eavesdropper and introduce a new class of secure
multicast codes that achieve the pairwise upper bound.
When specialized to the case of no eavesdroppers,
the resulting scheme yields a different coding scheme
than the vector codebook approach in [17]. The case
when there is one legitimate receiver and multiple
eavesdroppers is settled in [4], [16]. A new coding
scheme is proposed that meets the pairwise upper
bound. Some other recent works on the compound
wiretap channel include [18], [19].
2To the best of our knowledge, no upper bounds,
besides the pairwise upper bound, are known for the
compound wiretap channel. In this paper we study
the multi-input-single-output (MISO) wiretap channel,
where both the legitimate receivers and the eaves-
droppers channel take one of finitely many states. We
develop a new upper bound on secrecy-rate that is
tighter than the pairwise upper bound and establishes
that in general there is a loss in degrees of freedom
due to uncertainty of channel state information at
the transmitter. In addition we develop new lower
bounds that combine the real interference alignment
technique recently proposed in [20]–[23] with wiretap
code constructions. Our achievable degrees of freedom
remain constant, independent of the number of states of
the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper. In contrast we
observe that naive approaches based on time-sharing
only achieve vanishing degrees of freedom as the
number of states increase.
We also study an extension of the compound MISO
wiretap channel when there are two messages, that we
refer to as the compound private broadcast. To our
knowledge the private broadcast model is first proposed
by Cai and Lam [24]. While [24] only studies the de-
terministic broadcast channel, more recent works [10],
[25] study a larger class of channels including the dis-
crete memoryless channels and the multi-input-multi-
output Gaussian channels. The present paper extends
this model to the case when each receiver’s channel
takes one of finitely many states. Lower and upper
bounds on the sum of the secure degrees of freedom are
developed. While we restrict our analysis to the above
mentioned cases, we expect similar techniques to be
applicable to other extensions of the wiretap channel
such as [26] [27] [13] [14].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section II described the channel model and summarizes
the main results in this is paper. In section III we
review the real interference alignment scheme for the
scalar point-to-point Gaussian channel. Sections IV
and V establish lower and upper bound on the secrecy
degrees of freedom of the compound wiretap channel.
Sections VI and VII develop analogous results for the
compound private broadcast channel. Conclusions are
provided in section VIII.
II. MAIN RESULTS
The channel model consists of one transmitter with
M antennas and two receivers each with one antenna.
We further assume that the channels coefficient vectors
of the two receivers belong of a finite set i.e.,
h ∈ H = {h1,h2, . . . ,hJ1}
g ∈ G = {g1,g2, . . . ,gJ2}
(1)
It is assumed that each receiver knows its own channel
realization whereas the remaining terminals are only
aware of the sets H and G. Furthermore we assume
that the channel coefficients remain fixed for the entire
duration of communication. In our analysis of lower
and upper bounds we make one of the following two
assumptions.
Assumption 1: The channel vectors h1, . . . ,hJ1 as
well as g1, . . . ,gJ2 are each drawn from a real valued
continuous distribution.
Assumption 2: Any collection of M (or fewer vec-
tors) in H ∪ G be linearly independent.
We note that assumption 1, almost surely implies
assumption 2 and in this sense it is stronger. The first
assumption is used in the analysis of the lower bound
whereas the second assumption is used in the analysis
of the upper bound.
The resulting channel model can be expressed as
yj = h
T
j x+ vj , j = 1, . . . , J1
zk = g
T
k x+ wk, k = 1, . . . , J2
(2)
where the channel input vector x is required to satisfy
the average power constraint E[||x||2] ≤ P , the addi-
tive noise variables vj and wk are i.i.d. and distributed
N (0, 1).
In the remainder of this section we separately con-
sider two cases: the compound wiretap channel and the
compound private broadcast channel.
A. Compound Wiretap Channel
A compound wiretap encoder maps a message m,
uniformly distributed over a set of size 2nR, to the
channel input sequence xn. The decoder produces a
message estimate mˆj = gj(ynj ;hj). A rate R is achiev-
able if there exist a sequence of encoder and decoders
of such that Pr(e) = Pr(m 6= mˆj)→ 0 as n→∞ for
each j = 1, 2, . . . , J1 and 1nI(m; z
n
j ) → 0 for each
j = 1, 2, . . . , J2. The largest rate achievable under
these constraints is the compound secrecy capacity.
Of particular interest in this paper is the degrees of
freedom (d.o.f.) of the compound wiretap channel. We
say that d is an achievable secure degrees of freedom
for the compound wiretap channel, if there exists a
sequence of achievable rates R(P ), indexed by power
P , such that
d = lim
P→∞
R(P )
1
2 log2 P
. (3)
The maximum attainable value of d is the secrecy d.o.f.
of the compound wiretap channel.
We develop the following lower and upper bounds
on the secure degrees of freedom.
Theorem 1: Under assumption 1, the following se-
cure degrees of freedom are achievable for the com-
pound wiretap channel for all channel coefficient vec-
tors, except a set of measure zero,
dL =
{
1, min(J1, J2) < M,
M−1
M , min(J1, J2) ≥M.
(4)
3Fig. 1. Interference Alignment for the compound wiretap channel. Each of the four messages is drawn from a PAM constellation and
carries a rate ≈ 1
8
logP . The linear precoder V guarantees that while each legitimate receiver can decode all the four messages, each
eavesdropper can only obtain two integer linear combinations of the messages (and no other information about the messages), thus reducing
its signal dimension by a factor of 2. Precoding matrices based on real interference alignment techniques [20], [21] enable us to reduce
the signal dimension at an arbitrary number of eavesdroppers by a factor of ≈ 1
M
, thereby achieving ≈ 1 − 1
M
degrees of freedom in
Theorem 1.
The lower bound, for the case min(J1, J2) ≥ M ,
is achieved by combining real-interference alignment
with a wiretap code construction. We can interpret
the resulting degrees of freedom as follows. By using
interference alignment, the transmitter chooses sig-
nalling dimensions such that at each eavesdropper, the
received signal dimensions are reduced by a factor
of approximately 1M , whereas each intended receiver
incurs no loss in the received signal dimensions. A
wiretap code can then be designed to take advantage of
this discrepancy to achieve 1− 1M degrees of freedom.
It is noteworthy that interference alignment signifi-
cantly outperforms a naive time-sharing based scheme
where the achievable degrees of freedom approach zero
as the number of states becomes large.
Proposition 1: A scheme that combines time-
sharing and noise transmission achieves the following
degrees of feedom
dTSL =
{
1, min(J1, J2) < M
M−1
min(J1,J2)
, min(J1, J2) ≥M
(5)
Comparing (4) and (5) it is clear that interference
alignment provides significant gains in the degrees
of freedom compared to time-sharing based lower
bounds. The following example considers the case
of rationally dependent channel gains and shows that
higher achievable degrees of freedom can be achieved
by a multilevel coding scheme.
Proposition 2: Consider a special case of channel
model (2), where M = J1 = Je = 2 and furthermore
let
y1 = x1 + x2 + v1, y2 = x1 − x2 + v2
zk = xk + wk, k = 1, 2
(6)
corresponding to the choice of h1 = [1; 1], h2 =
[1;−1], g1 = [1; 0] and g2 = [0; 1]. There exists a
multi-level coding scheme that achieves log3 2 ≈ 0.63
secure d.o.f.
As will become apparent, the proposed multi-level
coding scheme bears similarity with the interference
alignment technique in that both schemes force the
eavesdropper receivers to decode linear combination of
transmitted symbols. However while the interference
alignment technique requires each legitimate receiver
to decode every message symbol, the proposed multi-
level coding scheme relaxes this constraint by taking
advantage of the special channel structure in (6).
The proof of Theorem 1 and Prop. 2 are provided
in section IV. The proof of Prop. 1 appears in Ap-
pendix A.
Theorem 2: Under assumption 2, the following ex-
pression provides an upper bound on the secure d.o.f.
of the compound wiretap channel
dU =
{
1, min(J1, J2) < M
1− 1M2−M+1 , min(J1, J2) ≥M
(7)
A new upper bound is derived in the proof of
Theorem 2 by considering the constraints imposed due
to secrecy and common message transmission. As we
show below, the single-letter upper bounds in earlier
works only yield 1 d.o.f. In particular the pairwise
upper bound on the secrecy capacity is
C ≤ max
px
min
j,k
I(x; yj |zk) (8)
4This bound can be interpreted as follows: consider
receiver j and eavesdropper k. An upper bound on
the secrecy capacity, in absence of all other terminals,
is I(x; yj |zk). Minimizing over all such pairs results
in (8). To the best of our knowledge this upper bound
has been shown to be tight in some special cases [3],
[15], [16]. For the compound MISO wiretap channel
however this upper bound results in 1 secure d.o.f.
Indeed with x ∼ N (0, PM I)
I(x; yi|zj) = I(x; yi, zj)− I(x; zj)
=
2∑
j=1
1
2
log
(
1 +
λj(H)P
M
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 +
P
M
||gj||
2
)
where λ1(H) and λ2(H) are the two non-zero eigen-
values of the matrix H =
(
hTi
gTj
)(
hi gj
)
. This
yields 1 d.o.f.
To improve the pairwise upper bound in (8) one can
incorporate the fact that each receiver wants a common
message i.e.,
C ≤ max
px
min
i,j
min{I(x; yi|zj), I(x; yi)} (9)
however it can easily be verified that this potentially
tighter bound also yields 1 d.o.f.
Instead of applying the single-letter bounds above in
Theorem 2 we start with the multi-letter characteriza-
tion and carefully combine the associated constraints
to get the proposed upper bound. We sketch the main
steps below.
First, via the secrecy constraint, we show that
nR ≤ ~(y1, . . . , yM )−
1
M
~(z1, . . . , zM )+nεn, (10)
where one can interpret the first term as the re-
ceived signal at an enhanced user who observed all
(y1, . . . , yM ) whereas the second term corresponds to
the observation at an “average eavesdropper”. Thus for
the rate to be large, we need either the joint entropy
of the eavesdropper observations (z1, . . . , zM ) to be
small or the joint entropy of the legitimate receivers
(y1, . . . , yM ) to be large.
Next we show that the joint entropy of (z1, . . . , zM )
cannot be too small compared to the joint entropy of
(y1, . . . , yM ). Recall that with J1 ≥ M and J2 ≥ M ,
both (h1, . . . ,hM ) and (g1, . . . ,gM ) constitute a basis
of RM . Using this property we show that
~(z1, . . . , zM ) ≥ ~(y1, . . . , yM )− nMd, (11)
where d is a constant that does not depend on P .
Combining (10) and (11) we can deduce that
nR ≤
(
1−
1
M
)
~(y1, . . . , yM ) + nd1 (12)
where d1 = d+ εn.
It thus follows that for the rate R to be large, we the
joint entropy of (y1, . . . , yM ) must be large. However
since a common message needs to be delivered to each
of the receivers, the outputs need to be sufficiently
correlated. In particular we show that
n(M − 1)R ≤
M∑
i=1
~(yi)− ~(y1, . . . , yM ) + nMεn.
(13)
Eq. (12) and (13) illustrate the tension between the
secrecy and common message transmission constraint.
For (12) to be large we need the output sequences
(y1, . . . , yM ) to be as independent as possible. How-
ever the common message constraint penalizes such
independence. Our upper bound in Theorem 2 exploits
this tension. A complete proof appears in section V.
B. Compound Private Broadcast
An encoder for the compound private broadcast
channel maps a message pair (m1,m2), distributed
uniformly and independently over sets of size 2nR1 and
2nR2 respectively, to the channel input sequence xn.
The decoders in group 1 produces a message estimate
mˆ1j = g1j(y
n
j ;hj) while the decoders in group 2
produce a message estimate mˆ2k = g2k(znk ;gk). A rate
pair (R1, R2) is achievable if there exist a sequence of
encoder and decoders of such that Pr(e) = Pr({m1 6=
mˆ1j}
J1
j=1 ∪ {m2 6= mˆ2k}
J2
k=1) → 0 as n → ∞ and
1
nI(m1; z
n
k ) → 0 and 1nI(m2; y
n
j ) → 0 for each
k = 1, . . . , J2 and j = 1, . . . , J1. The set of all
achievable rate pairs under these constraints constitutes
the capacity region.
Of particular interest is the sum secrecy degrees
of freedom (d.o.f.). We say that ds is achievable
if there exists a sequence of achievable rate pairs
(R1(P ), R2(P )), indexed by power P , such that
ds = lim
P→∞
R1(P ) +R2(P )
1
2 log2 P
. (14)
The maximum attainable value of ds is the sum-secrecy
d.o.f. of the compound private broadcast channel.
We develop the following lower and upper bounds
on the sum-secrecy degrees of freedom.
Theorem 3: Under assumption 1, almost surely, the
following sum-secrecy degrees of freedom are achiev-
able for the compound private broadcast channel
dsL =


2, max(J1, J2) < M
2M−1M , max(J1, J2) ≥M > min(J1, J2)
2M−1M+1 , min(J1, J2) ≥M (15)
The coding scheme, presented in section VI, also com-
bines wiretap codes with the interference alignment
scheme. The following theorem provides an upper
bound on the sum secrecy degrees of freedom
5Theorem 4: Under assumption 2, an upper bound on
the sum secrecy degrees of freedom of the compound
private broadcast channel is
dsU =


2, max(J1, J2) < M
2M−1
M , min(J1, J2) < M ≤ max(J1, J2)
2M−1M , min(J1, J2) ≥M. (16)
A proof provided in section VII extends the techniques
in the proof of Theorem 2.
Remark 1: Throughout this paper we assume the
channels to be real valued. However we do not expect
the results to be different for complex valued coeffi-
cients. In particular, the upper bounds in Theorem 2
and 4 immediately extend to the complex channel
coefficients as they are developed using standard tech-
niques. The lower bounds in Theorem 1 and 3 are
based on the real interference alignment scheme. Using
its recent extension to complex channel coefficients
sketched in [22], we expect similar results to hold for
complex valued channel coefficients as well.
III. REAL INTERFERENCE ALIGNMENT
In this section we review the main results of real
interference alignment from [20], [21]. For simplicity,
we describe this scheme for a point-to-point scalar
channel.
y = x + z , (17)
where the input satisfies a power constraint E[x2] ≤
P and the additive noise z ∼ N (0, σ2) is Gaussian.
Assume that the input symbols are drawn from a PAM
constellation,
C0 = a0 {−Q0,−Q0 + 1, . . . , Q0 − 1, Q0} . (18)
Two quantities associated with this constellation are
the minimum distance and the rate. In particular a0 =
dmin(C0) governs the error probability according to the
relation
Pr(e) ≤ exp
(
−
a20
8σ2
)
, (19)
while the rate is given by
R =
1
2
log(1 + 2Q0). (20)
Furthermore the choice of Q0 and a0 must satisfy the
average power constraint
E[x2] =
Q20a
2
0
12
≤ P. (21)
For an arbitrary ε > 0, select, Q0 = P
1−ε
2 and a0 =
P
ε
2
. Then,
Pr(e) ≤ exp
{
−
P ε
σ2
}
, R ≈
1− ε
2
logP (22)
shows that the error probability can be made suffi-
ciently small by selecting P large enough and further-
more the rate is close to the Shannon limit.
The idea behind real interference alignment is to
have multiple PAM constellation symbols instead of a
single constellation (18) and thus convert the channel
into a multi-input-single-output channel. In particular
consider a constellation
C = a {−Q,−Q+ 1, . . . , Q− 1, Q} . (23)
and suppose a total of L points b1, . . . , bL are drawn
independently from this constellation. The transmit
vector is of the form
x = αTb = [α1, . . . , αL]


b1
.
.
.
bL

 (24)
where α1, . . . , αL are rationally independent constants
(see def. 1).
As shown in Fig. 2, while the transmit constellation
is given by C in (23) and consists of (2Q+1) points, the
receiver constellation Cr(α) consists of all (2Q+1)M
points specified in (24) i.e.,
Cr(α) =
{
x ∈ R
∣∣∣∣∃b ∈ CM , x = αTb
}
. (25)
In our subsequent discussion we drop the explicit
dependence of Cr on α.
One key result in [20], [21] is a minimum distance
between points in Cr that depends on the constellation
parameters Q, a and L and holds for all vectors α,
except a set of measure 0.
Lemma 1 ( [20], [21]): For any ε > 0 there exists
a constant kε such that
dmin(Cr) ≥
kεa
QL−1+ε
, (26)
for all vectors α, except a set of measure zero.
The second key observation in [20], [21] is that there
is a one-to-one mapping between x and b in (24) if α
consists of rationally independent coefficients.
Definition 1: We say that α1, . . . , αL are rationally
independent real numbers if the equation
∑L
i=1 αici =
0 has no solution in (c1, . . . , cL) involving only ratio-
nal numbers.
Provided the vector α consists of only rationally
indpendent numbers, given an element x ∈ Cr, the
decoder can uniquely identify the vector of message
symbols b. Hence the error probability is given by
Pr(e) ≤ exp
{
−
d2min(Cr)
8σ2
}
= exp
{
−
k2εa
2
8σ2Q2(L−1+ε)
}
(27)
where we have used the expression for dmin stated
in Lemma 1. Finally with an appropriate choice of
Q and a, one can approach the Shannon limit while
6PSfrag replacementsb1
b2
bL
α1
α2
αL
C
Cr(α)
dmin
Fig. 2. Constellations for the real interference alignment scheme. The transmitter constellations are shown on the left hand side. Each of
the M points b1, . . . , bM are sampled independently from C = a{Q, . . . ,Q}. The receiver constellation Cr(α) consists of (2Q + 1)M
of the form x = αTb. The minimum distance in Cr(α) is stated in Lemma 1.
guaranteeing an arbitrarily small error probability in
the high SNR regime.
Proposition 3: [20], [21] Suppose that we select
Q = P
1−ε
2(L+ε) , a =
P 1/2
||α||Q
, (28)
then we have that E[x2] ≤ P and furthermore for all
values of α, except a set of measure zero, we have that
Pr(e) ≤ exp {−ηP ε} , (29)
where η > 0 is a constant that depends on the channel
coefficients α, but does not depend on P .
Proof: To show that the power constraint is sat-
isfied, note that since the elements of b are selected
independently from C, we have that
E[x2] = E

( L∑
i=1
αibi
)2 (30)
=
L∑
i=1
α2iE[b
2
i ] (31)
≤ a2Q2||α||2. (32)
Thus the choice of a in (28) guarantees that E[x2] ≤
P .
Substituting the value of a in (28) into (27) we have
that for all α, except a set of measure zero,
Pr(e) ≤ exp
{
−
k2εP
8σ2Q2(L−1+ε)Q2||α||2
}
= exp
{
−
k2εP
8σ2Q2(L+ε)||α||2
}
= exp
{
−
k2εP
ε
8σ2||α||2
}
(33)
= exp{−ηP ε} (34)
where we have used the relation (28) in (33) and
η =
k2ε
8σ2||α||2
> 0
is a constant that does not depend on P .
Note that the overall rate that one can achieve with
this multiplexed code,
R = L log(2Q+ 1) ≥
L(1− ε)
L+ ε
1
2
logP, (35)
can be made arbitrarily close to 12 logP by selecting ε
to be sufficiently small.
While the approach of multiple constellation points
does not provide any gains over using a single PAM
constellation (18) in the point-to-point case, the flexi-
bility in choosing any vector α consisting of rationally
independent elements, has been used in [20], [21] to
create interference alignment for the K− user inter-
ference channel and in [22], [23] for the compound
broadcast channel. In this work we show that this
approach can also provide significant gains for the
compound wiretap channel.
IV. COMPOUND WIRETAP CHANNEL: LOWER
BOUNDS
In this section we develop the lower bounds on the
secure degrees of freedom for the compound wiretap
channel.
In subsections IV-A and IV-B we provide the proof
of Theorem 1 for the case when min(J1, J2) < M
and min(J1, J2) ≥ M respectively. Subsection IV-C
provides a proof of Prop. 2.
For the proof of Theorem 1 our approach is to
evaluate the following lower bound on the secrecy
capacity for a specific input distribution.
Proposition 4: [15] An achievable secrecy rate for
the compound wiretap channel model (2) is
R = max
pu,x
{
min
j
I(u; yj)−max
k
I(u; zk)
}
(36)
for a choice of random variables (u, x) such that u →
x → (yi, zk) is satisfied.
7A. Proof of Theorem 1: min(J1, J2) < M
When either J1 < M or J2 < M we achieve full 1
d.o.f. through a combination of zero-forcing and noise
transmission techniques.
When J2 < M i.e., when the number of eavesdrop-
per states is less than M , we zero-force all the eaves-
droppers and achieve a rate that scales as 12 logP . In
particular note that the matrix G = [g1,g2, . . . ,gJ2 ] ∈
R
M×J2 has a rank equal to J2 < M . Construct a
matrix B ∈ RM−J2×M , with orthogonal rows, such
that B ·G = 0. Furthermore, almost surely, each hj is
linearly independent of the columns of G and hence
Bhj 6= 0 for j = 1, . . . , J2. The transmitted vector is
x = BTm, (37)
where the information vector m ∼ N
(
0, PM I
)
is a
vector of i.i.d Gaussian symbols. Since any information
transmitted along rows of B will not be seen by any
eavesdropper, setting u = m and x in (37), we have
that
R = min
j
I(m; yj) (38)
= min
j
1
2
log
(
1 +
P
M
||Bhj ||
2
)
(39)
which scales as 12 logP as Bhj 6= 0 for each j =
1, 2, . . . , J1.
Similarly when J1 < M , we achieve 1 d.o.f. by
transmitting a noise signal in the common null space
of the channel of legitimate receivers. While each
intended receiver only observes a clean signal, each
eavesdropper receives a superposition of signal and
noise and its rate does not increase unboundedly with
P .
In particular, the matrix H = [h1, . . . ,hJ1 ] has a
rank J1 < M . Construct A ∈ RM−J1×M with orthog-
onal rows that satisfy A ·H = 0. Furthermore, almost
surely, gj is linearly independent of the columns of H ,
and hence Agj 6= 0. Let the transmitted vector be,
x = ts +ATn, (40)
where t is any unit norm vector such that hTj t 6= 0 for
j = 1, 2, . . . , J1, and s ∼ N (0, P0) is the information
bearing symbol, and n ∼ N (0, P0IM−J1) is a vector
of noise symbols transmitted in the common null-space
of user matrices and where P0 = PM is selected to meet
the transmit power constraint. Accordingly the received
signals can be expressed as,
yj = h
T
j x+ vj (41)
= hTj ts + vj , (42)
and
zk = g
T
k x+ wk, (43)
= gTk ts + g
T
kA
Tn+ wk. (44)
An achievable secrecy rate with u = s and x in (40) is
R = min
j
I(s; yj)−max
k
I(s; zk) (45)
= min
j
1
2
log(1 + P0|h
T
j t|
2)
−max
k
1
2
log
(
1 +
P0|gTk t|
2
1 + P0||Agk||2
)
, (46)
which scales like 12 logP since ||Agk|| > 0 for each
k = 1, 2, . . . , J2 and hTj t > 0 for j = 1, . . . , J1.
B. Proof of Theorem 1: min(J1, J2) ≥M
To establish an achievable rate, we again evalu-
ate (36) for a certain choice of input distributed given
by the real interference alignment scheme in [20], [21].
To describe this choice, we begin by defining a set
T =
{
J2∏
k=1
M∏
i=1
gαkiki
∣∣ αki ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}
}
, (47)
where gki denotes the channel gain between the i−th
antenna and the k−th eavesdropper. Each selection
of the tuple {αki} ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}J2M results in
a different element of T and there are a total of
L = NMJ2 elements in this set. In addition let,
V =


vT 0 · · · 0
0 vT · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 · · · vT

 ∈ RM×ML (48)
be a matrix where v ∈ RL consists of all elements
in the set T . Furthermore let b ∈ RML×1 be a
vector whose entries are sampled independently and
uniformly from a PAM constellation
C = a {−Q,−Q+ 1, . . . , Q− 1, Q} . (49)
Our choice of parameters in (36) is
x = V b, u = b. (50)
We next state two lemmas, helpful in evaluat-
ing (36).
Lemma 2: The choice of transmit vector in (50)
results in the following effective channels at the le-
gitimate receivers and the eavesdroppers:
yj = h˜
T
j b+ vj
zk = g˜
TSkb+ wk
(51)
where the elements of h˜j ∈ RLM are rationally
independent for each j = 1, . . . , J1 and the elements
of g˜ belong to the set
A =
{
J2∏
k=1
M∏
i=1
gαkiki
∣∣ αki ∈ {0, . . . , N}
}
, (52)
8and the matrices Sk ∈ R(N+1)
J2M×LM have entries
that are either 0 or 1 and each row has no more than
M ones.
Proof: With the choice of V in (48), from direct
substitution,
h˜j =
[
hj1v
T , . . . , hjMv
T
]
. (53)
Since the elements hji are rationally independent, the
elments of v are rationally independent and indepen-
dent of hji it follows that all the elements of h˜j are
rationally independent. Similarly we have that
zk = g˜
T
k b+ wk, (54)
where
g˜Tk = g
T
k V =
[
gk1v
T , . . . , gkMv
T
]
. (55)
is a length ML vector whose elements belong to the
set A in (52).
Since all elements of g˜k belong to A and |A| =
(N + 1)J2M is, for sufficiently large N , smaller than
MNJ2M , it must that that the vector g˜k has repeated
elements. Thus we can also express
g˜Tk = g
TSk, (56)
where g is a vector consisting of all the elements in A
and Sk ∈ R(N+1)
J2M×LM is a matrix for which every
column has exactly one element that equals 1, and the
remaining elements are zero.
It remains to establish that each row in Sk cannot
have more than M elements that equal 1. Consider row
1 in Sk. If the elements in columns l1, . . . , lT equal 1
then it follows that g1 = g˜k,l1 = . . . = g˜k,lT . Thus to
upper bound the number of ones in any given row, we
count the number of elements in the vector g˜k in (55)
that can be identical. Since each element in v is distinct
it follows that no two elements of the vector gkivT can
be identical. Thus no more than M elements in g˜k can
be identical, completing the claim.
The following lemma specifies the parameters of the
PAM constellation (49) for the error probability at each
legitimate receiver in the virtual channel (51) to be
arbitrarily small. The proof closely follows the proof
of Prop. 3 and is omitted.
Lemma 3: Suppose that ε > 0 be an arbitrary
constant and let γ2 = 1M ∑
t∈T
t2 . Select
Q = P
1−ε
2(ML+ε)
a = γ
P
1
2
Q
(57)
then we have that ||x||2 ≤ P and for all channel
vectors, except a set of measure zero, we have that
Pr(e) ≤ exp (−ηP ε) , (58)
where η is a constant that depends on the channel
vector coefficients, but does not depend on P .
To evaluate (36), we will compute the terms I(b; yj)
and I(b; zk) separately. From (58) it follows via Fano’s
inequality that
H(b|yj) = 1 + Pr(e)H(b)
= 1 + Pr(e)LM log(2Q+ 1)
= 1 + oP (1),
where oP (1) denotes a function that goes to zero as
P →∞. Thus we have that
I(b; yj) = H(b)−H(b|yj)
= LM log(2Q+ 1)− 1− oP (1) (59)
≥ LM logQ− 1− oP (1)
=
LM(1− ε)
2(LM + ε)
logP − 1− oP (1) (60)
≥
(
1
2
− ε
)
logP − 1− oP (1), (61)
where (59) follows from the fact that each element of
the vector b is selected independently from C, and (60)
follows by substituting the choice of Q in (57) in
Lemma 3.
To upper bound the term I(b; zk) we note that
from (51) it follows that zk → Skb→ b holds. Hence
I(b; zk) ≤ I(b;Skb)
= H(Skb) (62)
≤
(N+1)MJ2∑
t=1
H({Skb}t) (63)
≤ (N + 1)MJ2 log(2MQ+ 1) (64)
≤ (N + 1)MJ2 {logQ+ log 4M}
= (N + 1)MJ2
{
1− ε
2(ML+ ε)
logP + log 4M
}
(65)
where (62) follows from the fact that Skb is a deter-
ministic function of b, while (63) from the fact that
conditioning reduces the entropy and finally (64) from
the fact that each row of Sk has at-most M elements
equal to 1 and the remaining elements equal to zero
as stated in Lemma 2 and hence the support of (Skb)t
is (−MQ, . . . ,MQ) and (65) follows by substituting
the value of Q in (57). Observe that
K1 , (N + 1)
MJ2 log 4M
is a constant that does not depend on P and substituting
L = NMJ2 ,
I(b; zk) ≤
1
2M(1 + ε)
(
1 +
1
N
)MJ2
logP +K1
=
1
2M(1 + ε)
(1 + oN (1)) logP +K1,
(66)
9where oN (1) is a term that goes to zero as N → ∞.
Finally substituting (61) and (66) in (36) we have that
lim
P→∞
R
1
2 logP
= 1− 2ε−
1
M(1 + ε)
(1 + oN (1))
(67)
which can be made arbitrarily close to 1 − 1/M , by
selecting N sufficiently large and ε sufficiently close
to zero.
C. Proof of Prop. 2
The achievabilty scheme in this example employs a
multi-level coding scheme. We first propose a coding
scheme for a linear deterministic channel over F3 and
then extend it to the Gaussian case using multi-level
coding.
1) Coding over a deterministic channel:
Proposition 5: Consider a linear deterministic chan-
nel over F3 with two input symbols x1 and x2 and with
output symbols described as follows:
y1 = x1 + x2
y2 = x1 − x2
zi = xi, i = 1, 2
(68)
where the addition and subtraction is defined over the
group in F3. Then we can achieve a secrecy rate of
R = 1 b/s for this channel.
Proof: The key idea behind the proof is to enable
the legitimate receivers to take advantage of the field
F3 in decoding while we limit the observation of the
eavesdroppers to binary valued symbols. The wiretap
code is illustrated below:
msg. (x1, x2)
0 (0, 0), (1, 1)
1 (0, 1), (1, 0)
(69)
When message bit 0 needs to be transmitted the sender
selects one of the two tuples (0, 0) and (1, 1) at ran-
dom and transmit the corresponding value of (x1, x2).
Likewise when bit 1 needs to be transmitted one of
the two tuples (0, 1) and (1, 0) will be transmitted.
Note that when b = 0 is transmitted y1 ∈ {0, 2} while
y2 = 0 whereas when b = 1 we have that y1 = 1
and y2 ∈ {1, 2}. It can be readily verified that each
receiver is able to recover either message. Assuming
that the messages are equally likely, it can also be
readily verified that the message bit is independent of
both x1 and x2 and thus the secrecy condition with
respect to each eavesdropper is satisfied.
2) Multilevel Coding Scheme: Fix integers T and
M with the following properties: T is the smallest
integer such that for a given ε > 0, Pr(E) ≤ ε where
E denotes the error event
E =
{
v1, v2 : max
i∈{1,2}
|vi| ≥ 3
T−1
}
(70)
and M is the largest integer such that 32M ≤ P/2.
We construct a multi-level code with a rate of M − T
information bits and error probability at-most ε.
Let the information bits be represented by the vector
b = (bT , . . . , bM−1). For each i ∈ {T, . . . ,M − 1},
we map the bit bi ∈ {0, 1} into symbols (x˜1(i), x˜2(i))
according to the code construction in (69). The trans-
mitted symbols are given by
xi =
M−1∑
l=T
x˜i(l)3
l, i = 1, 2 (71)
and the received symbols at the two receivers can be
expressed as,
y1 =
M−1∑
l=T
y˜1(l)3
l + v1, y2 =
M−1∑
l=T
y˜2(l)3
l + v2
(72)
where we have introduced
y˜1(l) = x˜1(l) + x˜2(l) ∈ {0, 1, 2},
y˜2(l) = x˜1(l)− x˜2(l) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}.
(73)
With the choice of M , it follows that E[||x||2] ≤ P .
Furthermore in the analysis of decoding, we declare
an error if maxi |vi| > 3T−1. Conditioned on Ec, note
that
yi − yi mod 3
T−1 (74)
= yi −
(
M−1∑
l=T
y˜i(l) 3
l
)
mod 3T − v1 mod 3
T (75)
= yi − v1 =
M−1∑
l=T
y˜i(l) 3
l. (76)
where we have used the fact that(∑M−1
l=T y˜i(l) 3
l
)
mod 3T = 0 since each term
in the summation is an integer multiple of 3T .
Thus by computing (74) it is possible to retrieve∑M−1
l=T y˜i(l) 3
l (assuming the error event does not
happen). Since there is no carry over across levels
we in turn retrieve (y˜i(T ), . . . , y˜i(M)) at each re-
ceiver. Then applying the same decoding scheme as
in Prop. 5 at each level, each receiver can recover the
underlying bits (bT , . . . , bM ). If however we have that
|vi| ≥ 3T−1, then the above analysis leading to (76)
fails and an error is declared. Since T is selected to be
sufficiently large, this event happens with a probability
that is less than ε.
In order to complete the analysis it remains to
show that H(b|zi) = M − T . We first enhance each
eavesdropper by removing the noise variable in (68)
i.e., z˜j = xj for j = 1, 2. Now consider
H(bT , . . . , bM |z˜i)
=H(bT , . . . , bM |x˜i(T ), . . . , x˜i(M))
=
M∑
l=T
H(bl|x˜i(l)) = M − T,
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where the last relation follows from H(bl|x˜i(l)) = 1
since we use the code construction in (69) in mapping
bl → (x˜1(l), x˜2(l)).
The resulting d.o.f. achieved by the multi-level code
is given by
d =
R
1
2 logP
(77)
=
M − T
1/2 (2M log2 3 + 1)
(78)
= log3 2 + oM (1), (79)
where oM (1)→ 0 as M →∞.
V. COMPOUND WIRETAP CHANNEL: UPPER
BOUND
In this section provide a proof of Theorem 2. We use
the convenient notation where the transmit vectors and
received symbols are concatenated together i.e., X =
[x(1), . . . ,x(n)] and likewise yj = [yj(1), . . . , yj(n)],
zk = [zk(1), . . . , zk(n)] etc. In this notation the chan-
nel can be expressed as
yj = h
T
j X + vj , j = 1, . . . , J1
zk = g
T
kX +wk, k = 1, . . . , J2
(80)
Note that it suffices to consider the case when
min(J1, J2) ≥M in Theorem 2. Otherwise the upper
bound equals 1, which continues to hold even in
absence of secrecy constraints.
Secondly we will assume that J1 = J2 = M in
deriving the upper bound. In all other cases, it is clear
that the upper bound continues to hold as we only
reduce the number of states.
For any code there exists a sequence εn that ap-
proaches zero as n→∞ such that
1
n
I(m; zk) ≤ εn, k = 1, 2, . . . ,M (81)
1
n
H(m|yj) ≤ εn, j = 1, 2, . . . ,M. (82)
where (81) is a consequence of the secrecy constraint
whereas (82) is a consequence of Fano’s inequality
applied to receiver j = 1, 2, . . . , Jr.
The proof is rather long and hence divided into the
following subsections.
Upper bound from secrecy constraint:
Lemma 4: The rate of any compound wiretap code
is upper bounded by the following expression:
nR ≤ ~(y1, . . . , yM )− ~(zk) + nck, (83)
where ck is a constant that does not depend on P .
The proof of Lemma 4 follows by considering the
secrecy constriaint between each receiver and eaves-
dropper. A proof is provided in Appendix B.
Using (83) in Lemma 4 for each eavesdropper k =
1, 2, . . . ,M and adding up the resulting upper bounds
we get that
nR ≤ ~(y1, . . . , yM )−
1
M
M∑
k=1
~(zk) + nc0, (84)
≤ ~(y1, . . . , yM )−
1
M
~(z1, . . . , zM ) + nc0,
(85)
≤
(
1−
1
M
)
~(y1, . . . , yM ) + nd+ nc0, (86)
where c0 = 1M
∑M
k=1 ck and d are constants that do
not depend on P . Here (85) follows from the fact
that conditioning reduced differential entropy and (86)
follows from
~(z1, . . . , zM ) ≥ ~(y1, . . . , yM )− nMd, (87)
where d is a constant that does not depend on P as
shown in Appendix C.
Upper bound from multicast constraint: We ob-
tain the following upper bound on the joint entropy
~(y1, . . . , yM )
Lemma 5:
~(y1, . . . , yM ) ≤
M∑
i=1
~(yi)− n(M − 1)R+Mnεn
(88)
Proof: Our upper bound derivation uses the fact
that the same message must be delivered to all the
receivers and hence the output at the M receivers must
be sufficiently correlated. Note that
~(y1, . . . , yM ) = ~(y1, . . . , yM |m) + I(m; y1, . . . , yM )
≤ ~(y1, . . . , yM |m) +H(m)
= ~(y1, . . . , yM |m) + nR (89)
≤
M∑
j=1
~(yj|m) + nR (90)
=
M∑
j=1
{~(yj)−H(m) +H(m|yj)}+ nR
≤
M∑
j=1
~(yj)−MH(m) + nMεn + nR
≤
M∑
j=1
~(yj)− (M − 1)nR+ nMεn (91)
where (89) and (91) follow from the fact that since
the message is uniformly distributed over the set of
size 2nR, it follows that H(m) = nR while (90) is
a consequence of the fact that conditioning reduces
differential entropy.
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Combining secrecy and multicast constraints: In the
final step we combine (86) and (88). In particular,
multipying both sides of (86) by M we get, with
d0 = d+ c0,
MnR = (M − 1)~(y1, . . . , yM ) + nMd
≤ (M − 1)

 M∑
j=1
~(yj)− (M − 1)nR+ nMεn


+ nMd0 (92)
≤ (M − 1)
M∑
j=1
~(yj)
− (M − 1)2nR+ nM(d0 + (M − 1)εn) (93)
Rearranging the terms in (93), we have that,
nR(M + (M − 1)2)
≤ (M − 1)
M∑
j=1
~(yj) + nM(d0 + (M − 1)εn)
(94)
An upper bound for ~(yj) provided in Appendix D,
(ref. (206) gives that
nR(M + (M − 1)2) (95)
≤ (M − 1)


M∑
j=1
n
2
max(logP, 0) + nd1


+ nM(d0 + (M − 1)εn) (96)
= (M − 1)M
n
2
max(logP, 0)
+ nM(d0 + (M − 1)εn + (M − 1)d1) (97)
Thus with d2 = M(d0 + (M − 1)εn + (M − 1)d1), a
constant that does not depend on P we have that
R ≤
M(M − 1)
M + (M − 1)2
(
1
2
logP, 0
)
+ d2 (98)
which yields the desired upper bound on the degrees
of freedom as stated in Theorem 2.
VI. COMPOUND PRIVATE BROADCAST: LOWER
BOUNDS
In this section we provide a proof for Theorem 3.
When max(J1, J2) < M the transmitter achieves
two degrees of freedom by zero-forcing the undesired
groups. In particular, it finds two vectors v1 and v2
such that hTj v2 = 0 and gTk v1 = 0 for j = 1, . . . , J1
and k = 1, . . . , J2. By transmitting x = v1m1+v2m2,
the effective channels at the two groups are given by
yj = h
T
j v1m1 + vj
zk = g
T
k v2m2 + wk
(99)
Furthermore since, almost surely hTj v1 6= 0 and
gTk v2 6= 0, it follows that one degree of freedom is
achievable for each of the two groups.
To establish the degrees of freedom in the remain-
ing two cases in Theorem 3, we combine the real
interference alignment scheme with wiretap coding.
In particular we evaluate the following single-letter
acheivable rate-pair for specific choice of auxiliary
random variables that result from the real-interference
alignment scheme.
Proposition 6: An achievable rate for the private
memoryless broadcast channel py1,...,yJ1 ,z1,...,zJ2 |x(·) is
as follows:
R1 = min
j
I(u1; yj)−max
k
I(u1; zk, u2)
R2 = min
k
I(u2; zk)−max
j
I(u2; yj , u1),
(100)
where (u1, u2) are mutually independent random vari-
ables. The joint distribution satisfies the Markov con-
dition
(u1, u2)→ x → (y1, . . . , yJ1 , z1, . . . , zJ2) (101)
and E[x2] ≤ P .
The proof of Prop. 6 is presented in Appendix E.
Case min(J1, J2) < M ≤ max(J1, J2): We as-
sume without loss of generality that J1 ≥M > J2. Let
v1 be a vector such that gTk v1 = 0 for k = 1, . . . , J2
and furthermore hTj v1 6= 0 for j = 1, . . . , J1. The
transmit vector x is given by
x = v1m1 + V2b2 (102)
where the precoding matrix V2 and information sym-
bols m1 and b2 are selected based on the real in-
terference alignement scheme as described below. Let
N2 ∈ N be a sufficiently large integer and define
T2 =


M∏
i=1
J1∏
j=1
h
βji
ji
∣∣∣∣ 0 ≤ βji ≤ N2 − 1

 (103)
A2 =


M∏
i=1
J1∏
j=1
h
βji
ji
∣∣∣∣ 0 ≤ βji ≤ N2

 (104)
consisting of L2 = NMJ12 and L′2 = (N2 + 1)MJ1
elements respectively. Let v2 ∈ RL2×1 be a vector
consisting of all elements in T2 and let
V2 =


vT2 0 . . . 0
0 vT2 . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 . . . vT2

 ∈ RM×ML2 . (105)
The elements b21, . . . , b2{ML2} of the information vec-
tor b2 ∈ RML2 for group 2 in (102) are sampled inde-
pendently and uniformly from the PAM constellation
of the form
C = a {−Q,−Q+ 1, . . . , Q− 1, Q} (106)
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while the information symbol for group 1 is of the
form
m1 = α
Tb1 = [ α1 . . . α(M−1)L2 ]


b11
.
.
.
b1(M−1)L2

 ,
(107)
where the elements αj are selected to be rationally in-
dependent of all other coefficients and their monomials
and the symbols in b1 are also sampled independently
and uniformly from the PAM constellation (106).
Substituting the choice of x in (102) the channel
model reduces to
yj = (h
T
j v1)α
Tb1 + h
T
j V2b2 + vj
zk = g
T
k V2b2 + wk
(108)
Following the same line of reasoning as in the proof of
Lemma 2, our choice of x in (102) reduces the channel
model as stated below.
Lemma 6: With choice of x in (102) the output
symbols at the receivers can be expressed as
yj = h˜
T
j b1 + h˜
TTjb2 + vj
zk = g˜
T
k b2 + wk
(109)
where h˜ ∈ RL′2 is a vector consisting of all the
elements in A2, (cf (104)), and the entries of vec-
tors h˜j and g˜k are rationally independent and also
independent of elements in A2. The entries of matrix
Tj ∈ R
L′2×ML2 are either 0 or 1 and there are no more
than M ones in each row of Tj .
The following Lemma can be established along the
lines of Prop. 3.
Lemma 7: Suppose that ε > 0 be an arbitrary
constant and let γ2 = 1∑
t∈T2
t2+
∑(M−1)L2
j=1 α
2
j
be a
normalizing constant that does not depend on P . If
we select
Q =
(
P
2
) 1−ε
2((M−1)L2+L
′
2+ε)
a = γ
(
P
2M
) 1
2
Q
(110)
then we have that ||x||2 ≤ P and for all channel
vectors, except a set of measure zero, we have that
Pr(e) ≤ exp (−ηP ε) , (111)
where η is a constant that depends on the channel
vector coefficients, but does not depend on P .
The achievable rate pair (R1, R2) is obtained by
evaluating (100) in Prop. 6 with u1 = b1, u2 = b2
and with x in (102).
R1 = min
j
I(b1; yj)−max
k
I(b1; zk,b2)
= min
j
I(b1; yj) (112)
= H(b1)−max
j
H(b1|yj)
= H(b1)− oP (1) (113)
=
(M−1)L2∑
i=1
H(b1i)− oP (1) (114)
= (M − 1)L2 log(2Q+ 1)− oP (1) (115)
≥ (M − 1)L2 log(Q)− oP (1)
= (M − 1)L2
1− ε
2((M − 1)L2 + L′2 + ε)
logP − oP (1)
(116)
where (112) follows from the fact that (b2, zk) are
independent of b1 in (109), and (113) follows from
Fano’s inequality via (137), and (114) and (115) follow
from the fact that the entries of b1 are selected
independently and uniformly from the constellation C
in (106) and finally (116) follows by substituting the
expression for Q in (110).
R2 = min
k
I(b2; zk)−max
j
I(b2; yj ,b1)
≥ min
k
I(b2; zk)−max
j
I(b2;Tjb2) (117)
≥ H(b2)−max
k
H(b2|zk)−max
j
H(Tjb2) (118)
≥ H(b2)− oP (1)−max
j
H(Tjb2) (119)
=ML2 log(2Q+ 1)− oP (1)−max
j
H(Tjb2)
(120)
≥ML2 log(2Q+ 1)− oP (1)−max
j
L′2∑
k=1
H({Tjb2}k)
(121)
where (117) follows from the fact that since b2 and b1
are indpendent, we have the Markov chain (b2, zk)→
Tjb1 → b1 for zk in (109), and (119) follows from
Fano’s inequality via (137), and (120) follows from
the fact that the entries of b2 are i.i.d. and uniformly
distributed over C in (106), and (121) follows from the
fact that conditioning reduces entropy.
We further simplify the last term in (121) as follows:
H({Tjb2}k) ≥ L
′
2 log(2MQ+ 1) (122)
≥ L′2 log(2Q+ 1) + L
′
2 logM (123)
(122) from the fact that as stated in Lemma 6 each
row of the matrix Tj has no more than M ones and
thus the support of each element {Tjb2}k is contained
in {−MQ, . . . ,MQ}. Substiuting (123) into (121) and
defining K = oP (1) + L′2 logM , a constant that does
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not depend on P , we have that
R2 ≥ (ML2 − L
′
2) log(2Q+ 1)−K (124)
≥ (ML2 − L
′
2) logQ−K
≥ (ML2 − L
′
2)
1− ε
2((M − 1)L2 + L′2 + ε)
logP −K
(125)
where the last term follows by substituting the expres-
sion for Q in (110). Using (116) and (125) we have
that
lim
P→∞
R1 +R2
1
2 logP
= (1 − ε)
(M − 1)L2 +ML2 − L′2
(M − 1)L2 + L′2 + ε
(126)
= (1 − ε)
2M − 1−
(
1 + 1N2
)MJ1
(M − 1) +
(
1 + 1N2
)MJ1
+ ε
N
MJ1
2
(127)
where we have substituted L2 = NMJ12 and L′2 =
(N2 + 1)
MJ1 in the last expression. Finally note that
the expression (127) can be made arbitrarily close
to 2M−1M by choosig N2 sufficiently large and ε
sufficiently close to zero.
Case min(J1, J2) ≥ M : When min(J1, J2) ≥ M ,
we need to do signal alignment to both groups of users.
Let J = max(J1, J2). We design our scheme assuming
J1 = J2 = J . Clearly this coding scheme can also be
used in the original case. We define
T1 =


M∏
i=1
J∏
j=1
g
αji
ji
∣∣∣∣ 1 ≤ αji ≤ N

 (128)
T2 =


M∏
i=1
J∏
j=1
hαjiji
∣∣∣∣ 1 ≤ αji ≤ N

 (129)
A1 =


M∏
i=1
J∏
j=1
g
αji
ji
∣∣∣∣ 1 ≤ αji ≤ N + 1

 (130)
A2 =


M∏
i=1
J∏
j=1
h
αji
ji
∣∣∣∣ 1 ≤ αji ≤ N + 1

 (131)
where the sets T1 and T2 consist of L = NMJ elements
whereas the sets A1 and A2 consist of L′ = (N+1)MJ
elements . Let v1,v2 ∈ RL×1 be vectors consisting of
all elements in T1 and T2 respectively and let
Vk =


vTk 0 . . . 0
0 vTk . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 . . . vTk

 , k = 1, 2 (132)
be the precoding matrices and let the transmit vector
be expressed as
x = V1b1 + V2b2, (133)
where the vectors b1,b2 ∈ RML consist of infor-
mation symbols for group 1 and 2 respectively. Each
entry in these vectors is sampled independently and
uniformly from the PAM constellation of the form
C = a {−Q, . . . , Q} . (134)
Following the line of reasoning in Lemma 2 and
Lemma 6 we have the following.
Lemma 8: With the choice of x in (133) we can
express the resulting channel output symbols at each
receiver as follows,
yj = h˜
T
j b1 + h˜
TTjb2 + vj
zk = g˜
T
k b2 + g˜
TSkb2 + wk,
(135)
where the vectors h˜, g˜ ∈ RL′ consist of all elements
belonging to the sets A2 and A1 respectively. The
elements of vector h˜j are rationally independent and
independent of the the elements of A1 and likewise
the elements of g˜k are rationally independent and
independent of the elements of A2. The matrices
Tj , Sk ∈ RL
′×ML have elements that take values
of either 0 or 1 and there are no more than M
elements whose value equals 1 in any given row of
these matrices.
The choice of parameters a and Q stated below can be
derived along the lines of Prop. 3.
Lemma 9: Suppose that ε > 0 be an arbitrary con-
stant and let γ2 = 1∑
t∈T2
t2+
∑
t∈T1
t2 be a normalizing
constant that does not depend on P . If we select
Q =
(
P
2
) 1−ε
2(ML+L′+ε)
a = γ
(
P
2M
) 1
2
Q
(136)
then we have that ||x||2 ≤ P and for all channel
vectors, except a set of measure zero, we have that
Pr(e) ≤ exp (−ηP ε) , (137)
where η is a constant that depends on the channel
vector coefficients, but does not depend on P .
Finally to compute the achievable rate pair we substi-
tute in (100), u1 = b1, u2 = b2 and x as specified
in (133). Following analogous calculations that lead
to (125) we have that
R1 ≥
(ML− L′)(1 − ε)
ML+ L′ + ε
−K (138)
R1 ≥
(ML− L′)(1 − ε)
ML+ L′ + ε
−K, (139)
where K is a constant that does not depend on P .
Substituting L = NMJ and L′ = (N + 1)MJ ,
lim
P→∞
R1 +R2
1
2 logP
= 2(1− ε)
M −
(
1 + 1N
)MJ
M +
(
1 + 1N
)MJ
+ ε
NJM(140)
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which can be made arbitrarily close to 2M−1M+1 by
selecting N sufficiently large and ε sufficiently close
to zero.
VII. COMPOUND PRIVATE BROADCAST: UPPER
BOUNDS
When max(J1, J2) ≤M , the stated upper bound is
2. It holds even when J1 = J2 = 1.
When min(J1, J2) < M ≤ max(J1, J2) we assume
without loss of generality that J1 < J2. The upper
bound is developed assuming J1 = 1 and J2 =
M . Any sequence of codes that achieves a rate-pair
(R1, R2) satisfies, via Fano’s inequality,
1
n
H(m1|y1) ≤ εn,
1
n
H(m2|zk) ≤ εn, k = 1, . . . ,M,
(141)
and the secrecy constraints
1
n
I(m2; y1) ≤ εn,
1
n
I(m1; zk) ≤ εn, k = 1, . . . ,M,
(142)
We can upper bound the sum-rate of the messages as:
n(R1 +R2) ≤ I(m1,m2; y1, z1, . . . , zM ) + nεn
= ~(z1, . . . , zM ) + ~(y1|z1, . . . , zM )
− ~(y1, z1, . . . , zM |m1,m2) + nεn (143)
Since the channel vectors g1, . . . ,gM are linearly
independent, we can express
h1 =
M∑
k=1
λkgk
and hence
~(y1|z1, . . . , zM ) ≤ ~
(
y1 −
M∑
i=1
λizi
)
(144)
= ~
(
v1 −
M∑
i=1
λiwi
)
= nK1 (145)
where K1 is a constant that does not depend on P . We
also have that
~(y1, z1, . . . , zM |m1,m2) (146)
≥ ~(y1, z1, . . . , zM |m1,m2, X) (147)
= ~(v1,w1, . . . ,wM ) = nK2, (148)
where K2 is a constant that does not depend on P .
From (143) with K3 = K1 −K2 + εn, we have that
n(R1 +R2) ≤ ~(z1, . . . , zM ) + nK3. (149)
Since message 2 needs to be delivered to M re-
ceivers, we have from Lemma 5, that
(M − 1)nR2 ≤
M∑
i=1
~(zi)− ~(z1, . . . , zM ) + nεn,
(150)
and it follows from (141) that
nR1 ≤ I(m2; y1)
= ~(y1)− ~(y1|m2)
= ~(y1) +K4 (151)
Combining (149), (150) and (151) we have that
nM(R1 +R2) ≤
M∑
i=1
~(zi) + (M − 1)~(y1) + nK5,
(152)
where K5 = (M − 1)K4 + K3 is a constant that
does not depend on P . Using the upper bound in
Appendix D on the entropy of received vector we have
that
nM(R1 +R2) ≤ (2M − 1)
n
2
max (logP, 0) + nK6,
(153)
and hence,
lim
P→∞
R1 +R2
1
2 logP
=
2M − 1
M
, (154)
as required.
In the final case when min(J1, J2) ≥ M , we
develop the upper bound assuming that J1 = J2 = M .
The upper bound continues to hold when J1 ≥M and
J2 ≥M as we are only reducing the number of states.
For any private broadcast code, there exists a sequence
εn such that
1
n
H(m1|zk) ≤ εn,
1
n
I(m1; zk) ≤ εn (155)
It follows via (83) in Lemma 4 that
nR1 ≤ ~(y1, . . . , yM )− ~(zk) + nck, (156)
where ck is a constant that does not depend on P .
Similarly applying Fano’s Inequality
1
n
H(m2|zk) ≤ εn (157)
for message m2 we can establish along the lines of
Lemma 5, that
~(z1, . . . , zM ) ≤
M∑
i=1
~(zi)− n(M − 1)R2 +Mnεn
(158)
Furthermore, using (87) we have that for a constant d
that does not depend on P , we have that
~(y1, . . . , yM ) ≤ ~(z1, . . . , zM ) + nMd (159)
≤
M∑
i=1
~(zi)− n(M − 1)R2 +Mnεn + nMd,
(160)
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where the last relation follows by substituting (158).
Combining (156) and (160) and rearranging, we have
that
nR1 + n(M − 1)R2 (161)
≤
M∑
i=2
~(zi) + nMd+ nc1 +Mnεn (162)
≤ (M − 1)
n
2
max (logP, 0) + nK, (163)
where nK = n(M−1)d1+nMd+Mnεn is a constant
that does not depend on P . Note that the last relation
follows by the upper bound on the entropy of each
received vector as derived in Appendix D. Using a
symmetric argument it follows that
nR2 + n(M − 1)R1 ≤ (M − 1)
n
2
max (logP, 0) + nK, .
(164)
Combining (163) and (164), we have that
lim
P→∞
R1 +R2
1
2 logP
≤ 2
M − 1
M
(165)
as required.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper develops new upper and lower bounds
on the degrees of freedom of the compound wiretap
channel. The upper bound is developed through a new
technique that captures the tension between the secrecy
and common message constraints and strictly improves
the pairwise upper bound. A lower bound, that achieves
non-vanishing degrees of freedom for arbitrary number
of receiver states, is established based on the real
interference alignment technique. These techniques are
extended to a related problem: the private broadcast
channel and again new upper and lower bounds on the
degrees of freedom are established.
Our results suggest that interference alignment can
potentially play a significant role in designing robust
physical layer secrecy protocols. This technique pro-
vides the mechanism to reduce the number of dimen-
sions occupied by an interfering signal at a receiver,
thus increasing the number dimensions that are avail-
able for the signal of interest. We apply this technique
to reduce the observed signal dimensions at multiple
eavesdroppers, thus significantly enhancing the rates
achieved for the compound wiretap channel compared
to traditional techniques. Nevertheless, we illustrate
by an example that unlike the K− user interference
channel [20] and the compound MIMO broadcast
channel [22], [23], a direct application of interference
alignment cannot achieve the secrecy capacity of the
compound wiretap channel. In terms of future work it
will be interesting to close the gap between the upper
and lower bounds. Another promising direction is to
investigate recent ideas on practical techniques based
on reconfigurable antennas [28] for the compound
wiretap channel model.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROP. 1
It suffices to consider the case when min(J1, J2) ≥
M , since the other case is covered in Theorem 1. We
separately show how to attain M−1J1 and
M−1
J2
degrees
of freedom.
A. Attaining M−1J1 degrees of freedom
Our coding scheme is described as follows.
1) Let T = ( J1M−1) denote all possible subsets of
users of size M − 1. We label these subsets as
S1, . . . ,ST . Note that each user belongs to T0 =(
J1−1
M−2
)
subsets.
2) Let n be a sufficiently large integer. A message
m consists of nT0R0 information bits where
R0 =
1
2
logP −Θ, (166)
and where Θ is a sufficiently large constant,
(which will be specified later) that does not
grow with P . The message is mapped into
a codeword of a (T, T0) erasure code C i.e.,
m→ (m1,m2, . . . ,mT ) where each symbol mi
consists of nR0 information bits. Each receiver
retrieves the message m provided it observes any
T0 symbols. Furthermore as established in [3]
suitable wiretap code constructions exist such
that provided each of the T symbols are indi-
vidually protected, the overall message remains
protected. i.e.,
I(mt; z
n
k ) ≤ nεn, ∀t = 1, . . . , T
⇒ I(m; znk ) ≤ Tnεn (167)
The overall rate R = T0T R0 results in the
following degrees of freedom:
d =
T0
T
=
(
J1−1
M−2
)
(
J1
M−1
)
=
M − 1
J1
as required.
It remains to show how to transmit message mt
such that each user in a subset St decodes it with
high probability while satisfying I(mt; znk ) ≤
nεn.
3) Each subset St is served over n channel uses.
The message mt is transmitted to M − 1 users
belonging to this subset along the lines of The-
orem 1 when J1 < M i.e., by transmitting
information symbols in the common range space
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and noise in the common null space of these
users (c.f. (40)).
xt = uts + atn, (168)
where at and ut are unit norm vectors such that
hTi ut 6= 0 and hTi at = 0 for each i ∈ St and s
and n are information bearing and noise symbols
respectively.
Following the analysis leading to (46) we can
see that the following rate is achievable:
Rt =
1
2
logP −Θt,
Θt = −min
i∈St
1
2
log |hTi ut|
2+
max
k
1
2
log
(
1 +
|gTk ut|
2
|aTt gk|
2
)
,
(169)
where Θt is a constant that does not scale with
P . Furthermore we let Θ in (166) to be
Θ = max
t
Θt. (170)
4) With the choice of rate in (166) every user in
each subset St can decode the message mt with
high probability. Each user will have access to
T0 elements of the codeword (m1, . . . ,mT ) and
hence recover the original message m. Further-
more each individual message is protected from
each eavesdropper
I(mt; z
n
k ) ≤ nεn (171)
and hence from (167) it follows that I(m; znk ) ≤
nTεn. Since εn can be made sufficiently small,
the secrecy condition is satisfied.
B. Attaining M−1J2 degrees of freedom
Our coding scheme is described as follows.
1) We considers all possible T e = ( J2M−1) sub-
sets of M − 1 eavesdroppers and label them
as S21 , . . . ,S
2
T e . Note that each eavesdropper
belongs to a total of T e1 =
(
J2−1
M−2
)
subsets.
2) Consider a parallel noise-less wiretap channel
consisting of T e links, where each link supports
a rate nR1, where
R1 =
1
2
logP − Ω (172)
and Ω is a sufficiently large constant that will
be specified later. Each eavesdropper is absent
on a total of T e1 links while each legitimate
receiver observes all the T e links. Following the
scheme in [3] we can transmit a message m
of rate nR1T e1 by mapping the message m →
(m1, . . . ,mT e). The symbol mk, consists of nR1
bits and forms the input message on channel k.
3) For each choice of S2t , we transmit information
in the common null-space of the eavesdroppers
in this selected set. Let bt be a vector such that
bTt gj = 0 for each j ∈ S2t and transmit
xt = bts,
where s is the information bearing symbol. Since
each vector hi is linearly independent of any
collection of M−1 eavesdropper channel vectors
it follows that hTi bt 6= 0, and one can achieve a
rate
R1 =
1
2
log

1 + min
t∈{1,...,T e}
i∈{1,...,J1}
|hTi bt|
2P


≥
1
2
logP − Ω, (173)
where
Ω = − min
t∈{1,...,T e}
i∈{1,...,J1}
1
2
log |hTi bt|
2. (174)
With this choice of Ω, each receiver decodes each
of the messages m1, . . . ,mT with high probabil-
ity. Furthermore, each of the eavesdropper does
not have access to T1 sub-messages correspond-
ing to the subsets St to which it belongs. By
virtue of our code construction, this ensures that
I(m; znk ) ≤ nεn.
The overall achievable rate is given by R =
T e1
T eR1 and hence the achievable degrees of free-
dom are given by
d =
T e1
T e
=
(
J2−1
M−2
)
(
J2
M−1
) = M − 1
J2
as required.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
From the secrecy constraint and Fano’s inequality
(c.f. (81) and (82)) we have that for any length n code
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with rate R:
nR = H(m) ≤ H(m|y1) + I(m; y1)
≤ I(m; y1) + nεn (175)
≤ I(m; y1)− I(m; zk) + 2nεn (176)
≤ I(m; y1, y2, . . . , yM−1, zk)− I(m; zk) + 2nεn
≤ I(m; y1, . . . , yM−1|zk) + 2nεn
= ~(y1, . . . , yM−1|zk)−
~(y1, . . . , yM−1|zk,m) + 2nεn
≤ ~(y1, . . . , yM−1|zk)−
~(y1, . . . , yM−1|zk, X,m) + 2nεn
= ~(y1, . . . , yM−1|zk)−
~(v1, . . . , vM−1) + 2nεn (177)
= ~(y1, . . . , yM−1, zk)− ~(zk)−
n(M − 1)
2
log(2pie) + 2nεn (178)
= ~(y1, . . . , yM , zk)− h(yM |y1, . . . , yM−1, zk)
− ~(zk)−
n(M − 1)
2
log(2pie) + 2nεn
= ~(y1, . . . , yM )− ~(zk)
− h(yM |y1, . . . , yM−1, zk) + ~(zk|y1, . . . , yM )
+ 2nεn −
n(M − 1)
2
log(2pie) (179)
where (175) and (176) are consequences of Fano’s
Lemma (82) and the secrecy constraint (81) respec-
tively, (177) follows from the fact that the noise
variables (v1, . . . , vM−1) in (80) are independent of
(x, zK) and finally (178) follows from the fact that the
noise variables are i.i.d. N (0, 1).
To complete the argument it suffices to show that
there exist constants d1k and d2k, that are independent
of P such that
~(yM |y1, . . . , yM−1, zk) ≥ nd1k (180)
~(zk|y1, . . . , yM ) ≤ nd2k. (181)
To establish (180) we observe that
~(yM |y1, . . . , yM−1, zk) ≥ ~(yM |y1, . . . , yM−1, zk, X)
= ~(vM |y1, . . . , yM−1, zk, X)
=
n
2
log 2pie , nd1k
where the last relation follows from the fact that the
noise variable vM is independent of all other variables.
To establish (181) we observe that the collection of
vectors (h1, . . . ,hM ) constitutes a basis for RM i.e.,
we can express
gk = Hkbk (182)
where Hk = [h1,h2, . . . ,hM ] ∈ RM×M is a matrix
obtained by stacking the channel vectors of the M
legitmate receivers, bk ∈ RM is a vector. Hence we
have that
~(zk|y1, . . . , yM ) (183)
= ~

zk − bTk


y1
.
.
.
yM


∣∣∣∣∣ y1, . . . , yM


≤ ~

zk − bTk


y1
.
.
.
yM




= ~

wk − bTk


v1
.
.
.
vM



 (184)
=
n
2
log 2pie
(
1 + ||bk||
2
)
, nd2k (185)
where we use (182) in (184) and the last relation
follows from the fact that the noise vectors consist of
independent Gaussian entries N (0, 1).
Thus we have from (179) that
nR ≤ ~(y1, . . . , yM )− ~(zk) + nck, (186)
where
ck = 2εn+
M
2
log 2pie+
1
2
log 2pie(1+ ||bk||
2) (187)
is a constant that does not depend on P .
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF (87)
Define the channel matrices
H =


hT1
.
.
.
hTM

 , G =


gT1
.
.
.
gTM

 , (188)
and the noise matrices
W =


w1
.
.
.
wM

 , V =


v1
.
.
.
vM

 , (189)
so that we can express


y1
.
.
.
yM

 = HX + V,


z1
.
.
.
zM

 = GX +W.
(190)
Then (87) is equivalent to showing that,
~(GX +W ) ≥ ~(HX + V )− nMd, (191)
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for some constant d that does not depend on P .
~(GX +W )
= ~(HX + V )− ~(HX + V |GX +W )
+ ~(GX +W |HX + V )
≥ ~(HX + V )− ~(HX + V |GX +W )
+ ~(GX +W |HX + V,X) (192)
= ~(HX + V )− ~(HX + V |GX +W ) + ~(W )
(193)
= ~(HX + V )− ~(HX + V |GX +W ) +
n
2
log 2pie
(194)
where in (192) we use the fact that conditioning
reduces the differential entropy, in (193) and (194), we
use the fact that noise variables in W are independent
of V and i.i.d. N (0, 1).
Further note that
~(HX + V |GX +W )
= ~(V −HG−1W |GX +W ) (195)
≤ ~(V −HG−1W )
=
n
2
log 2pie det
(
I +HG−1G−THT
)
, (196)
where we use the fact that the channel matrices H
and G are full rank and invertible in (195) and that
they have i.i.d. N (0, 1) entries in (196). Substituting
in (194) it follows that
~(GX +W ) ≥ ~(HX + V )
−
n
2
log det
(
I +HG−1G−THT
)
(197)
and thus we can select
d =
1
2M
log det
(
1 +HG−1G−THT
)
.
in (87).
APPENDIX D
BOUND ON ~(yj)
Define the input covariance at time t, Kx(t) =
E[x(t)x(t)T ] and let Pt = trace(Kx(t)). Recall from
the power constraint that 1n
∑n
t=1 Pt ≤ P . Since
yj(t) = h
T
j x(t) + vj(t)
we have that
var(yj(t)) = h
T
j Kx(t)hj + 1 (198)
≤ λmax(Kx(t))||hj ||
2 + 1 (199)
≤ Pt||hj ||
2 + 1 (200)
where (198) follows from the fact the noise vari-
able vj is indpendent of the input x(t), (199) from
the variational characterization of eigen values (see
e.g., [29]) and finally (200) follows from the fact that
Pt ≥ trace(Kx(t)) exceeds the sum of the eigen values
and hence exceeds the largest eigen value.
~(yj) =
n∑
t=1
~(yj(t)) (201)
=
n∑
t=1
1
2
log 2pie
(
Pt||hj ||
2 + 1
) (202)
≤
n
2
log 2pie
(
||hj ||
2 1
n
n∑
t=1
Pt + 1
)
(203)
≤
n
2
log 2pie
(
||hj ||
2P + 1
) (204)
≤
n
2
max (logP, 0) +
n
2
log 2pie(1 + ||hj ||
2)
(205)
where (201) follows from the fact that conditioning
reduces the differential entropy, (202) from the fact
that a Gaussian random variable maximizes the differ-
ential entropy among all random variables with a fixed
variance and (203) follows from Jensen’s inequality,
since the log(·) function is concave and (204) follows
from the power constraint. To get an upper bound on
all 1 ≤ j ≤M we have that
~(yj) ≤
n
2
max (logP, 0) + nd1 (206)
where
d1 =
1
2
log 2pie(1 + max
1≤j≤M
||hj ||
2) (207)
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROP. 6
For any joint distribution of the form
pu1,u2,x,y1,...,yJ1 ,z1,...,zJ2
= pu1pu2px|u1,u2py1,...,yJ1 ,z1,...,zJ2 |x . (208)
we show that the following rate pair is achievable
R1 = min
j
I(u1; yj)− I(u1; u2, z
⋆
k )− δ (209)
R2 = min
k
I(u2; zk)− I(u2; u1, y
⋆
j )− δ, (210)
where δ > 0 is an arbitrary constant and where we
have introduced,
k⋆ = argmax
k
I(u1; u2, zk), j
⋆ = argmax
j
I(u2; u1, yj).
We start by constructing codebooks
C1 =
{
un1ab : a = 1, . . . , 2
nR1 , b = 1, . . . , 2nI(u1;u2,z
⋆
k)
}
C2 =
{
un2ab : a = 1, . . . , 2
nR2 , b = 1, . . . , 2nI(u2;u1,y
⋆
j )
}
(211)
We assume that the codewords in C1 belong to the
set T nε (u1) of strongly typical sequences whereas the
codewords in C2 belong to the set T nε (u2). Given mes-
sages m1 and m2 the encoder sets a1 = m1, a2 = m2
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and selects b1, uniformly from {1, . . . , 2nI(u1;u2,z
⋆
k)}
and b2 uniformly from the set {1, . . . , 2nI(u2;u1,y
⋆
j )}. It
selects codewords (un1a1b1 and u
n
2a2b2
) from C1 and
C2 respectively and then transmits xn generated by
passing codewords through the memoryless, fictitious
channel px|u1,u2(·).
With the choice of R1 and R2 specified in (209)
and (210) it can be shown, (see e.g., [25]), that there
exist codebooks C1 and C2 in (211) such that the error
probability at each receiver is smaller than any target
value. Furthermore receiver k⋆ in group 2 can decode
the index b1 with high probability if it is revealed m1
in addition to (znk⋆ , un2 ). Similarly eavesdropper j⋆ can
decode the index b2 if it is revealed m2 in addition to
(ynj⋆ , u
n
1 ) i.e.,
max
{
1
n
H(un1 |z
n
k⋆ , u
n
2 ,m1),
1
n
H(un2 |y
n
j⋆ , u
n
1 ,m2)
}
≤εn
(212)
For such a codebook, we show that for some sequence
εn that approaches zero as n→∞, we have that
1
n
I(m1; z
n
k ) ≤ εn,
1
n
I(m2; y
n
j ) ≤ εn (213)
for k = 1, . . . , J2 and j = 1, . . . , J1. We first observe
that it suffices for us to show that
1
n
I(m1; z
n
k⋆) ≤ δn,
1
n
I(m2; y
n
j⋆) ≤ δn. (214)
As we show below, one can provide sufficient side
information to enhance each eavesdropper so that it is
equivalent to the strongest eavesdropper. Then it is easy
to verify that if the coding scheme guarantees (214)
then the messages are also secure from the enhanced
eavesdroppers and hence the original eavesdroppers.
Lemma 10: For each k = 1, . . . , J2 there exists a
variable z˜k that satisfies (u1, u2) → x → (zk, zk⋆) →
z˜k such that I(u1; u2, zk⋆) = I(u1; u2, zk, z˜k). Like-
wise for each j = 1, . . . , J1 there exists a variable y˜j
that satisfies (u1, u2)→ x → (yj , yj⋆)→ y˜j such that
I(u2; u1, yj⋆) = I(u2; u1, yj , y˜j).
The proof of Lemma 10 will be provided at the end of
this section. To establish (214) consider:
1
n
H(m1|z
n
k⋆) ≥
1
n
H(m1|z
n
k⋆ , u
n
2 ) (215)
≥
1
n
H(un1 ,m1|z
n
k⋆ , u
n
2 )− δn (216)
=
1
n
H(un1 |z
n
k⋆ , u
n
2 )− δn (217)
=
1
n
H(un1 |u
n
2 )−
1
n
I(un1 ; z
n
k⋆ |u
n
2 )− δn (218)
where (215) follows from the fact that condition-
ing on un2 reduces the entropy, (216) follows from
via (212), (217) follows from the fact that m1 is a
deterministic function of un1 and hence can be dropped
from the conditioning. We separately bound the two
terms in (218).
1
n
H(un1 |u
n
2 ) =
1
n
H(un1 ) = min
j
I(u1; yj⋆)− δ,
(219)
where we have used the fact that the codeword un1 is
independently selected of un2 in our construction and is
uniformly distributed over the set C1. We upper bound
the second term in (218) as follows. Since the cascade
channel (u1, u2)→ zk⋆ is memoryless, it an be easily
verified that
I(un1 ; z
n
k⋆ |u
n
2 ) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(u1i; zk⋆i|u2i) (220)
Furthermore for each codebook in the ensemble of
typical codebooks we have from the weak law of large
numbers that the summation on the right hand side
converges to nI(u1; zk⋆ |u2) i.e., the mutual informa-
tion evaluated with the original input distribution. Thus
we can write
I(un1 ; z
n
k⋆ |u
n
2 ) ≤ nI(u1; zk⋆ |u2)− non(1), (221)
where on(1) converges to zero as n → ∞. Substitut-
ing (219) and (221) into (218) we establish the first half
of (214). The second half of (214) can be established
in an analogous manner.
It remains to provide a proof of Lemma 10 which
we do below.
Lemma 10: The construction of random variable
z˜k follows the same approach as in the case of com-
pound wiretap channel [15]. In particular suppose that
Ik ∈ {k, k
⋆} is a random variable independent of all
other variables. Let Pr(Ik = k⋆) = p.
Define a new random variable, zIk = (zIk , Ik)
and consider the function f(p) = I(u1; u2, zk, zIk).
It is clear that f(0) = I(u1; u2, zk) ≤ I(u1; u2, zk⋆)
whereas f(1) = I(u1; u2, zk, zk⋆) ≥ I(u1; u2, zk⋆).
Thus there exists a value of p⋆ ∈ [0, 1] such that
I(u1; u2, zk, zIk) = I(u1; u2, zk⋆)
and the resulting random variable in Lemma 10 is
given by z˜k = (zIk , Ik). The construction of y˜k follows
in an analogous manner.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Insightful discussions with Frank Kschischang and
Suhas Diggavi during the early stages of this work
are gratefully acknowledged. The author also thanks
T. Liu for careful reading of the proof in Theorem 2
in an earlier preprint of this work.
20
REFERENCES
[1] A. Khisti, “On the compound MISO wiretap
channel,” in Information Theory and its Appli-
cations Worksop, Jan. 2010. [Online]. Available:
http://ita.ucsd.edu/workshop/10/files/paper/paper 1231.pdf
[2] A. D. Wyner, “The wiretap channel,” Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol. 54,
pp. 1355–87, 1975.
[3] A. Khisti, A. Tchamkerten, and G. W. Wornell, “Secure Broad-
casting over fading channels,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory,
Special Issue on Information Theoretic Security, 2008.
[4] P. Gopala, L. Lai, and H. E. Gamal, “On the secrecy capacity
of fading channels,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, Oct, 2008.
[5] Y. Liang, H. V. Poor, and S. Shamai, “Secure communication
over fading channels,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, June, 2008.
[6] A. Khisti, G. W. Wornell, A. Wiesel, and Y. Eldar, “On the
Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel,” in Proc. Int. Symp. Inform.
Theory, Nice, 2007.
[7] A. Khisti and G. W. Wornell, “Secure transmission with
multiple antennas: The MISOME wiretap channel,” To Appear,
IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory.
[8] ——, “Secure transmission with multiple antennas: The MI-
MOME wiretap channel,” To Appear, IEEE Trans. Inform.
Theory.
[9] H. D. Ly, T. Liu, and Y. Liang, “Multiple-input multiple-output
gaussian broadcast channels with common and confidential
messages,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, July, 2009, submitted.
[10] R. Liu, T. Liu, H. Poor, and S. Shamai, “Multiple-input
multiple-output gaussian broadcast channels with confidential
messages,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, To Appear.
[11] T. Liu and S. Shamai, “A note on the secrecy capacity of
the multiple-antenna wiretap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inform.
Theory, June, 2009.
[12] S. Shafiee, N. Liu, and S. Ulukus, “Towards the secrecy
capacity of the Gaussian MIMO wire-tap channel: The 2-2-
1 channel,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, Sept., 2009.
[13] E. Ekrem and S. Ulukus, “The secrecy capacity region of the
gaussian mimo multi-receiver wiretap channel,” IEEE Trans.
Inform. Theory, March, 2009, submitted.
[14] G. Bagherikaram, A. S. Motahari, and A. K. Khandani, “Se-
crecy capacity region of gaussian broadcast channel,” in CISS,
2009.
[15] Y. Liang, G. Kramer, H. V. Poor, and S. S. (Shitz), “Compound
wire-tap channels,” EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communi-
cations and Networking, Special Issue on Wireless Physical
Layer Security, submitted 2008.
[16] T. Liu, V. Prabhakaran, and S. Vishwanath, “The secrecy
capacity of a class of non-degraded parallel gaussian compound
wiretap channels,” Jul. 2008.
[17] A. A. El Gamal, “Capacity of the product and sum of two un-
matched broadcast channels,” Probl. Information Transmission,
pp. 3–23, 1980.
[18] E. Ekrem and S. Ulukus, “Degraded compound multi-receiver
wiretap channels,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, Oct., 2009,
submitted.
[19] E. Perron, S. N. Diggavi, and E. Telatar, “On cooperative
wireless network secrecy,” in INFOCOM, April 2009.
[20] A. S. Motahari, S. O. Gharan, and A. K. Khandani, “Real
interference alignment with real numbers,” Submitted to IEEE
Trans. Inform. Theory, http://arxiv.org/abs/0908.1208 , 2009.
[21] A. S. Motahari, S. O. Gharan, M. Maddah-Ali, and A. K. Khan-
dani, “Real interference alignment: Exploiting the potential
of single antenna systems,” Submitted to IEEE Trans. Inform.
Theory, http://arxiv.org/abs/0908.2282 , 2009.
[22] M. Maddah-Ali, “On the degrees of freedom of the compound
mimo broadcast channels with finite states,” Submitted to IEEE
Trans. Inform. Theory, http://arxiv.org/abs/0909.5006 , 2009.
[23] T. Gou and C. W. S. A. Jafar, “On the degrees of freedom of
finite state compound wireless networks - settling a conjecture
by weingarten et. al.”
[24] N. Cai and K. Y. Lam, “How to broadcast privacy: Secret
coding for deterministic broadcast channels,” Numbers, Infor-
mation, and Complexity (Festschrift for Rudolf Ahlswede), eds:
I. Althofer, N. Cai, G. Dueck, L. Khachatrian, M. Pinsker, A.
Sarkozy, I. Wegener, and Z. Zhang, pp. 353–368, 2000.
[25] R. Liu, I. Maric, P. Spasojevic, and R. D. Yates, “Discrete
memoryless interference and broadcast channels with confiden-
tial messages: Secrecy capacity regions,” IEEE Trans. Inform.
Theory, June 2009.
[26] O. Koyluoglu, H. E. Gamal, L. Lai, and H. V. Poor, “Interfer-
ence alignment for secrecy,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, Oct.
2008, submitted.
[27] X. He and A. Yener, “Secure degrees of freedom for gaus-
sian channels with interference: Structured codes outperform
gaussian signaling,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory.
[28] C. Wang, T. Guo, and S. A. Jafar, “Aiming perfectly in the
dark - blind interference alignment through staggered antenna
switching,” e-print arXiv:1002.2720.
[29] G. Golub and C. F. V. Loan, Matrix Computations (3rd ed).
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
